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Introduction
Many people in Europe, in-cluding Turkey, wonder why there are still some 200 U.S. 
nuclear weapons on their soil, espe-
cially after the Nuclear Weapons Ban 
Treaty was adopted by a majority of 
states in the world on July 7, 2017. 
Nuclear weapons will become ob-
solete, and among the most obvious 
are the Cold War leftovers lingering 
in Europe. These B-61 nuclear grav-
ity bombs were stationed in Europe 
during the Cold War to deter the 
Soviet bear. While this extended nu-
clear deterrent may have made sense 
(arguably) in the “good old days” of 
the Cold War, most pundits nowa-
days agree that at least from a military 
point of view these weapons are irrel-
evant.1 Or should we say “agreed”? 
The Ukraine crisis does not help our 
case, at least at first sight. “The pros-
pects for nuclear reductions in Eu-
rope are bleak,” as Lukasz Kulesa ar-
gued.2 Some argue that Russia’s inva-
sion of Crimea and its provocations 
in the Eastern part of Ukraine prove 
that the threat remains, and that Rus-
sia should be contained and deterred 
as it was during the Cold War. Those 
who fear the Russian threat point 
out that such deterrence should in-
clude a nuclear component, prefera-
bly as close as possible to the Russian 
border.3 
COMMEN ARY






Vol. 19 / No. 3 / 
2017, pp. 23-33
Mr. Trump, Post Nuclear Ban  
Treaty, NATO’s Nuclear Weapons  
in Europe are Obsolete
MUSTAFA KİBAROĞLU* and TOM SAUER**
ABSTRACT This commentary makes the case as to why the U.S. tac-
tical nuclear weapons that have been stationed in Europe since 
the 1960s should be removed, and how this could be done in the 
most effective way under the presidency of Donald Trump. It 
concludes with a summary of the expected benefits of this move, 
and a reminder that the costs of continued muddling through are 
substantial.
DOI: 10.25253/99.2017193.02
MUSTAFA KİBAROĞLU and TOM SAUERCOMMENTARY
24 Insight Turkey
To put everything into perspec-
tive, it should be acknowledged that 
even before the crisis in Ukraine, the 
withdrawal of nuclear weapons was 
opposed by the Eastern European 
NATO member states, especially the 
Baltic States. This issue was at the 
heart of the internal deliberations of 
the NATO Deterrence and Defense 
Posture Review in 2011-2012. At that 
time, Germany asked for withdrawal, 
while the Baltic States, supported 
by France, preferred the status quo. 
Others held in-between positions. 
Because NATO had agreed to decide 
with consensus, kicking the can was 
the result. For those who had already 
been skeptical of the idea of with-
drawal before the crisis, the issue is 
now dead. We argue that they may 
be wrong; and, President Trump may 
prove them wrong. 
The cost-benefit calculus of keeping 
the Cold War weapons in Europe did 
not change fundamentally, even after 
the crisis in Ukraine. Just as the cav-
alry became grotesque in an age of 
armored vehicles, the remaining U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe 
are an anachronism dating back to 
the high days of the Cold War. It is as 
if the U.S. forgot to take them away. 
These weapons of mass destruction 
in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ger-
many, Italy and Turkey4 are becoming 
a liability on a variety of fronts.
Despite substantial efforts by differ-
ent host nations to send them back, 
the NATO decision-making ma-
chinery has proved itself incapable 
of overcoming niches of resistance, 
mostly from outside the host nations. 
There is no consensus on withdraw-
ing them, but at the same time there 
is no consensus on keeping them. 
This inertia is a recipe for escalat-
ing internal political frictions within 
the Alliance,5 and it is all the more 
problematic in an age where nuclear 
weapons are being banned. The cur-
rent stalemate may be seen as an ex-
ample of what Donald Trump had in 
mind when he repeatedly –both as a 
presidential candidate and as presi-
dent– called NATO “obsolete.”
Russia has a point in asking the 
United States to withdraw its remain-
ing tactical nuclear weapons back to 
its own territory before starting up 
bilateral negotiations, as Moscow had 
already removed its nuclear weapons 
from the Central European states two 
decades ago. Waiting for a NATO 
consensus provides an ideal pretext 
for the nuclear czars at NATO head-
quarters and their colleagues in the 
defense ministries who prefer a status 
quo because of grooved thinking and 
parochial interests. President Trump 
will not abolish NATO, but he might 
shake up the organization by limiting 
U.S. military contribution to the Alli-
Just as the cavalry became 
grotesque in an age of 
armored vehicles, the 
remaining U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe are an 
anachronism dating back to 
the high days of the Cold War
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ance. The withdrawal of the last U.S. 
nuclear weapons from Europe would 
perfectly fit his narrative.
This article makes the case as to why 
these weapons should be removed, 
and how this could be done in the 
most effective way. It concludes with 
a summary of the expected benefits 
of this move, and a reminder of the 
substantial costs of continued mud-
dling through.
Why Should the Remaining U.S. 
Nuclear Weapons Be Removed 
from Europe? 
First of all, weapons of mass de-
struction are weapons of the past. 
Modern warfare takes into account 
the fundamental principles of inter-
national humanitarian law, such as 
proportionality and non-discrimina-
tion. The world, including the U.S., 
only started to take the war in Syria 
serious once chemical weapons were 
used. For the same humanitarian rea-
sons, when the United States inter-
vened militarily in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, it aimed to limit the number 
of civilian and military casualties on 
both fronts. Such limitation and dis-
cretion are by definition impossible 
with nuclear weapons, which is also 
the major reason why atomic weap-
ons have not been used since 1945.6 
Each day the anti-nuclear norm has 
become stronger. 
For the same reason, a majority of 
states in the world are now banning 
nuclear weapons. That goal fits the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), which entered into force in 
1970 and is the cornerstone of today’s 
global nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament regime. Indicative of 
this trend is that the final commu-
niqué of the five-yearly NPT Review 
Conference in 2010 for the first time 
mentioned the humanitarian conse-
quences of the use of nuclear weap-
ons. Resolutions in this regard in the 
UN General Assembly or the NPT 
Preparatory Committee (Prepcoms) 
meetings have attracted a growing 
number of sponsoring or supporting 
countries: 14 at the NPT Prepcom in 
2012, 33 at the UNGA in the second 
half of 2012, and 78 at the NPT Prep-
com in 2013. NATO member state 
Norway organized a governmental 
conference on this subject with the 
participation of more than 125 coun-
tries in the beginning of March 2013, 
followed by a similar conference in 
Mexico attended by 143 countries. A 
third conference took place on De-
cember 8-9, 2014 in Vienna.7 In Oc-
tober 2016, a historic resolution was 
adopted by the UN General Assem-
bly calling for a conference to nego-
tiate a legally binding instrument to 
prohibit nuclear weapons, leading 
towards their total elimination (Nu-
clear Ban Treaty) to begin in March 
2017 and continue in June and July 
of the same year. That happened, and 
these negotiations came successfully 
to an end on July 7, 2017 when 122 
nations adopted an international 
treaty banning nuclear weapons.8
Advocates of nuclear deterrence 
claim that nuclear weapons are not 
meant to be used. That is only half 
of the story. The crux of the matter 
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is that nuclear deterrence implies 
the willingness to use nuclear weap-
ons; otherwise, deterrence becomes 
meaningless. Tactical nuclear weap-
ons were part of NATO’s flexible 
response strategy during the Cold 
War when NATO had fewer conven-
tional weapons than the U.S.S.R. This 
may clarify why NATO still prefers 
keeping these weapons in Europe, 
although this time around it is Rus-
sia that is “inferior,” conventionally 
speaking, and has more reasons to 
rely on nuclear deterrence. 
As the use of nuclear weapons be-
comes increasingly regarded as il-
legitimate and incompatible with 
modern international law, the golden 
age of nuclear weapons is over. That 
may not be the dominant point of 
view in the nuclear weapon states 
and some of the aspiring nuclear 
weapon states. However, it is increas-
ingly the view in the remaining 180 
states in the world, including the Eu-
ropean host nations of the U.S. tacti-
cal nuclear weapons.
Admittedly, the road to “Nuclear 
Zero” will take time and cannot be 
realized overnight. The process has 
started, however, and will be very dif-
ficult to stop. It got a significant boost 
from the high-level support of the 
idea in the United States, first by the 
so-called “four horsemen,” namely 
Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Bill 
Perry and Sam Nunn in 2007,9 and 
another two years later from an im-
pressive speech by President Obama 
in Prague, in which he stated with 
conviction –literally and figuratively– 
that it is in the national interest of the 
United States to aim for a world with-
out nuclear weapons, not just as a 
nice long-term goal, but as a concrete 
and ambitious policy priority.10
Britain’s PM May, 
U.S. President 
Trump and NATO 
Secretary General 
Stoltenberg look 
on as Belgian PM 
Michel speaks 
during a working 
dinner meeting at 
the NATO summit 
on May 25, 2017.
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A central element in further delegiti-
mizing nuclear weapons involves lim-
iting existing nuclear arsenals to very 
low levels of strategic nuclear weap-
ons, which may serve the interim pur-
pose of minimum deterrence.11 There 
is no room for tactical nuclear weap-
ons in a minimum deterrence posture. 
Another characteristic of minimum 
deterrence is to limit the stationing of 
land-based nuclear weapons to one’s 
own territory. The Nuclear Weapons 
Ban Treaty explicitly prohibits the 
transfer of nuclear weapons to other 
states. The United States is currently 
the only nuclear weapon state that has 
nuclear weapons stationed on the ter-
ritory of other countries. If this pol-
icy is not reversed in the foreseeable 
future, one should not be surprised 
to see it mimicked by other nuclear 
weapon states. One could imagine, 
for instance, Pakistani tactical nuclear 
weapons on Saudi Arabian territory 
in case Iran goes nuclear. Therefore, 
the United States should, lead the way 
by withdrawing the American B-61s 
from Europe as soon as possible. 
Another compelling reason to with-
draw the weapons is the reality that 
the delivery systems for these bombs 
are tactical aircraft such as F-16s that 
cannot even reach Russian territory. 
During the Cold War, these aircrafts 
were supposed to bomb the Warsaw 
Pact countries. Today, Central Eu-
ropean states like Poland, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and the Baltic states have 
become full members of NATO and 
the European Union. In short, there 
is no military justification to retain 
American tactical nuclear weapons 
on European territory. 
The fact that these weapons are left 
untouched creates new security con-
cerns in an age of terrorism, and huge 
financial burdens. The more these 
weapons are scattered over different 
bases, the easier it will be for non-state 
actors to seize these weapons. In 2001, 
for instance, Nisar Trabelsi –born in 
Tunisia, raised in Belgium, and rad-
icalized by his al-Qaeda brothers in 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan region– re-
portedly had concrete plans to blow 
up the Kleine Brogel air base where 
the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in 
Belgium are stored.12 Luckily, this 
terrorist plot was thwarted and Tra-
belsi was taken into custody. In 2010, 
peace activists succeeded in walking 
inside the same base for more than 
one hour without seeing any sol-
dier.13 Later on, Belgium experienced 
nuclear terrorism incidents similar to 
that envisioned by Trabelsi, including 
sabotage at the Doel 4 nuclear reactor 
on August 4, 2014, and a surveillance 
incident in November 2015 that may 
have led to the kidnapping of a high-
Despite the ineffectiveness 
of tactical nuclear weapons 
from a military perspective 
after the Cold War, one cannot 
ignore the importance of 
these weapons for extended 
deterrence and their symbolic 
value as a representation of 
the U.S. commitment to the 
Alliance
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level nuclear expert by those who are 
responsible for the Paris and Brussels 
terrorist attacks. For similar security 
reasons, the U.S. B-61 bombs were 
withdrawn from Greece in 2001. 
The İncirlik nuclear weapons base in 
Turkey is stationed close to the Syr-
ian border. The base played a remark-
able role during the coup attempt in 
Turkey on July 15, 2016. The Turkish 
military commander of the base, who 
was involved in the coup attempt, re-
portedly refused to allow a U.S. com-
bat aircraft to land during the episode. 
At the same time, he allowed Turkish 
military aircraft to play an active role 
during the attempted coup. Taking 
into account the fact that there are 
nuclear weapons stationed in İncir-
lik, any security breach there would 
be like playing with fire.
One might argue that, over time, the 
problem will automatically resolve 
when these weapons or their delivery 
vehicles become outdated. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the case. The nature 
of nuclear weapons is such that they 
always have to be kept safe in times of 
peace, which requires regular updates 
and upkeep. Furthermore, nuclear 
bureaucracies always aim to remain 
in existence and accrue ever more 
funds. Both processes have resulted 
in very expensive modernization 
plans for the B-61s, including those 
that are stationed in Europe. In the 
foreseeable future, the U.S. plans to 
spend 10 billion U.S. dollars on these 
400 B-61 nuclear bombs. That means 
25 million U.S. dollars per piece, 
which is approximately as much as its 
value in gold.14 One wonders whether 
the American taxpayers in times of 
financial and economic crisis would 
not prefer having this money spent 
on defenses systems that could be 
used on the battlefield, let alone on 
education or social security. By the 
way, the modernization will also in-
clude a new tail for the B-61 bomb, 
which will make it even more accu-
rate and “usable.”15
Despite the ineffectiveness of tactical 
nuclear weapons from a military per-
spective after the Cold War, one can-
not ignore the importance of these 
weapons for extended deterrence and 
their symbolic value as a representa-
tion of the U.S. commitment to the 
Alliance. The most cited reason why 
NATO did not agree to withdraw 
the tactical nuclear weapons during 
the deliberations of the new NATO 
Strategic Concept in 2010, or during 
the Deterrence and Defense Posture 
Review (DDPR), are concerns on the 
part of some Eastern European coun-
tries and especially the Baltic States. 
Because of historical experiences, 
they feel more reassured with these 
tactical nuclear weapons in place. 
If the strength of NATO 
depends on a few outdated 
tactical nuclear weapons that 
will not be used anymore, 
we are afraid that this state 
of affairs says a lot about the 
strength of the Alliance in 
general
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At first sight, this is understandable. 
Their geographical situation makes 
them feel uncomfortable with Rus-
sia nearby. Although it would be far-
fetched to argue that Russia would 
have the intention of attacking any of 
these countries, the 2008 war against 
Georgia and the current crisis in 
Ukraine may be raised as a counter-
argument. With that said, the Baltic 
States, in contrast to Georgia and 
Ukraine, are members of the Alliance 
and therefore Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty covers them. The major 
question is whether Article 5 should 
or should not include an extended 
nuclear deterrent in the form of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons on Euro-
pean territory. It should be noted that 
nuclear weapons are not mentioned 
in the Washington Treaty, let alone in 
Article 5. It remains a purely political 
decision to either keep or remove the 
U.S. nuclear weapons from European 
soil, just as all U.S. nuclear weapons 
were removed from South Korean 
soil in the beginning of the 1990s.
Admittedly, there remains a huge 
need to reassure the Baltic States. 
However, there are much more cred-
ible means of providing reassurance 
than the deployment of B-61 bombs 
in Europe that are not only mili-
tarily useless, but also increasingly 
perceived as illegitimate and, in the 
not so distant future, even illegal. 
Indeed, the reaction by the West to 
the Ukraine crisis supports the idea 
that these tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe are irrelevant. NATO sent 
conventional, not nuclear, military 
support in the form of troops and 
planes to the Baltic States after the 
crisis in Ukraine, and even more af-
ter the Warsaw Summit in 2016. On 
May 19, 2014, NATO Secretary Gen-
eral Anders Fogh Rasmussen explic-
itly excluded the option of stationing 
nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, 
confirming what had been agreed at 
the 1997 NATO-Russian Founding 
Act.16 And rightly so, because no-
body believes that NATO is going to 
use nuclear weapons, even in the ex-
tremely unlikely case that the Baltic 
States were to be overrun by Russia. 
Last but not least, if the strength of 
NATO depends on a few outdated 
tactical nuclear weapons that will not 
be used anymore, we are afraid that 
this state of affairs says a lot about the 
strength of the Alliance in general. 
Most observers acknowledge that if 
the United States decided to with-
draw these weapons from Europe, the 
Baltic States would not resist. 
How Should the Bombs Be 
Withdrawn? 
As shown above, the question is not 
so much why the remaining Ameri-
can tactical nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope should be withdrawn, but how 
they can be withdrawn. Two deci-
sions have to be made in this regard: 
first of all, should the withdrawal 
be linked to a similar move by Rus-
sia, and secondly, should the United 
States seek a NATO consensus? 
We believe that the answer to both 
questions should be a clear and simple 
no. In an ideal world, Russia should be 
pressured to reciprocate immediately, 
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for instance by relocating its tactical 
nuclear weapons and moving them to 
Central Russia. Realistically speaking, 
however, that may not happen. As 
mentioned earlier, Russia had already 
removed its tactical nuclear weapons 
from foreign soil immediately follow-
ing the Cold War. Moscow now insists 
that the Americans should follow suit 
before the negotiations start. 
Furthermore, it would not be very 
smart to begin formal negotiations 
on this subject. First, Russia will only 
give up its larger tactical arsenal on 
the condition that the United States 
gives up additional weapon systems 
that are not related to tactical nuclear 
weapons (e.g., missile defense, stra-
tegic nuclear weapons in reserve, or 
ICBMs with conventional warheads). 
That is not in the interest of the United 
States. Better to withdraw them uni-
laterally and hope that Russia will re-
ciprocate in one way or another.
Second, while Russia may have more 
tactical nuclear weapons than the 
West, the overall nuclear arsenal of 
Russia is quantitatively more or less 
identical and qualitatively inferior 
to that of the United States. The in-
equality with respect to the overall 
force structure –nuclear and conven-
tional– is even more in favor of the 
West. NATO spends more than 800 
billion U.S. dollars on defense; Rus-
sia 70 billion U.S. dollars equivalent. 
NATO has 3.6 million armed forces; 
Russia 0.8 million. NATO has 5,900 
combat aircraft (including 2,000 be-
longing to European NATO member 
states); Russia 1,571. To conclude, the 
withdrawal will not make any differ-
ence with respect to the overall bal-
ance of military power. 
Finally, the Cold War is over, and 
the idea of parity should have long 
become meaningless, except in the 
minds of nuclear bureaucrats who 
use the principle of parity as an ar-
gument for keeping and moderniz-
ing the stockpiles they are steward-
ing. If President Trump believes that 
it would be in the national interest 
of the United States and its allies to 
remove tactical nuclear weapons 
from Europe, he should do so, even 
if Russia is not prepared to recipro-
cate immediately. This proposal may 
offend dogmatic thinkers, but partial 
unilateral nuclear disarmament may 
indeed sometimes be in the national 
interest.17 Of course, such a step re-
quires political leadership. 
To make this move politically more 
attractive for a president who has 
to operate in a highly polarized do-
mestic environment on a daily basis, 
the alternative consists of approach-
ing the Russians in advance, and to 
informally agree that Moscow will 
If President Trump believes 
that it would be in the national 
interest of the United States 
and its allies to remove tactical 
nuclear weapons from Europe, 
he should do so, even if Russia 
is not prepared to reciprocate 
immediately
MR. TRUMP, POST NUCLEAR BAN TREATY, NATO’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ARE OBSOLETE
2017 Summer 31
respond with a positive step after 
the withdrawal by the United States. 
Despite the lack of intricate verifi-
cation mechanisms, these informal 
reciprocal steps are sometimes more 
effective than formal bilateral arms 
control agreements with extensive 
verification schemes. The largest nu-
clear reductions ever achieved were 
realized thanks to the unilateral and 
reciprocal Presidential Nuclear Ini-
tiatives enacted between 1990-1991, 
when President Gorbachev and Pres-
ident Bush Sr. withdrew and elimi-
nated thousands of tactical nuclear 
weapons. This example can now be 
repeated, if on a smaller scale. NATO 
and the U.S. clearly recognize the 
possibility of informal reciprocity, as 
indicated in NATO’s Strategic Con-
cept of 201018 and the 2010 U.S. Nu-
clear Posture Review.19 
The second question is whether there 
should be consensus within NATO 
before the weapons are withdrawn. 
The latter is currently the point of 
view of the Alliance. The result, how-
ever, is a status quo that does nothing 
to mitigate the underlying differences 
of opinion. NATO is just kicking 
the proverbial can down the road. 
It is not difficult to predict that the 
uneasiness regarding these atomic 
weapons in countries like Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium is only 
going to rise. Three indications of 
this trend include: (1) a tough par-
liamentary resolution in the Dutch 
parliament (including the Chris-
tian-Democrats) in December 2012, 
asking the government to regard the 
withdrawal as a ‘hard objective,’ (2) 
a statement by former Dutch Prime 
Ministers Ruud Lubbers and Dries 
van Agt (both Christian-Democrats) 
that there are still nuclear weapons in 
the Netherlands and that this policy 
is outdated, (3) and a row between 
the Dutch and the U.S. government 
U.S. Defense 
Secretary James 
Mattis and the 
defense ministers 
of the Baltic 
States, where 
NATO is deploying 
battle groups for 
the first time, 
held talks.
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about the financial liabilities in case 
of a nuclear weapons accident on 
Dutch territory.20 In Belgium, a na-
tional protest meeting was organized 
on October 20, 2013, and the Flem-
ish Parliament agreed on a resolution 
asking for withdrawal in April 2015. 
The German government's declara-
tion in 2009 had already proposed 
the withdrawal.
Over the last two decades, the United 
States has withdrawn thousands of 
nuclear weapons from around the 
globe, including from Europe (the 
United Kingdom, Greece, and par-
tially from Germany) without much 
fanfare, let alone a formal consensus. 
These weapons were both installed 
and taken away on a bilateral basis. 
There is no reason to change that pro-
cess by multi-lateralizing the deci-
sion-making process now. President 
Trump should take the lead and do 
what is needed and take these weap-
ons home as soon as possible. 
Conclusion
The benefits of immediate withdrawal 
are numerous. First of all, as already 
stated, the withdrawal will put an 
end to an unpleasant and at times 
acrimonious debate inside the Alli-
ance that has already gone on since 
the 1990s. Positively framed, the le-
gitimacy of the Alliance in countries 
like Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium will rise if these weapons are 
withdrawn. Second, the withdrawal 
may improve the soured relation-
ship between Russia and the United 
States, and open the door to further 
reductions in other weapon systems, 
through formal or informal agree-
ments, in the future. 
Third, the withdrawal may stimulate 
a debate inside Europe about the fur-
ther role of the British and the French 
nuclear weapons. Of course, the 
American nuclear weapons should 
not be replaced by EU nuclear weap-
ons. Fourth, withdrawal will make it 
much more difficult for other nuclear 
weapon states to start deploying nu-
clear weapons on other states’ terri-
tory. Finally and most importantly, 
the withdrawal may give a boost to 
the global non-proliferation and dis-
armament regime, which is currently 
under heavy fire. Reducing the num-
ber of states with nuclear weapons on 
their territory from 14 to 9 would sig-
nal to the non-nuclear weapon states 
that their initiative for a Nuclear 
Weapons Ban Treaty is paying off. 
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